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Abstract
This paper aims to focus on one of the non-exclusive benefits of a currency union and to
analyze its welfare impacts on the regions inside and outside. Presenting a three-region model
with optimizing consumers, the paper demonstrates that the non-exclusive benefits depend on
the fixed costs of cross-currency transactions and the elasticity of input substitution.
Elasticities close enough to one ensure the non-exclusive benefits to exceed non-exclusive
costs. The implications are that the external effects of a currency union can cause the union to
be too small in size, and that the elasticity is a critical criterion for optimum currency areas.
JEL classification: F33, F36
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1  Introduction
Usually one currency circulates within one nation. Is a nation, however, an optimum cur-
rency area? Since Mundell (1961)'s discussion on how the degree of labor mobility deter-
mines the impacts of monetary unification, numerous researchers have been developing the
theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) and proposing its criterion.
The theory has yet to develop in at least two directions. Firstly, researchers have been
more concerned with which regions would have less cost in a currency union than with which
regions would benefit more. As a result, there's a strong tendency toward negatively evaluating
any currency union. Among the classical and most famous OCA criteria, degree of labor
mobility (Mundell (1961)), openness of an economy (McKinnon (1963)), and diversity of pro-
duction (Kennen (1969)), all determine the costs of a union. In addition, asymmetry of
shocks, the most popular criterion in empirical researches on the EMU (Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993), Bini Smaghi and Vori (1994)), is also a determinant of the costs.
Secondly, discussions on the OCA criteria have usually been lacking in microeconomic foun-
dations. The empirical researches have been employing the criteria, the validity of which has
rarely been argued.1
This study focuses on the benefits of a currency union in contrast to previous literatures
that placed focus on the cost aspects. This study evaluates a currency union favorably. The
objective requires the model to include optimizing consumers, in order to investigate welfare
impacts of monetary integration. The model should also involve at least three regions, in order
to examine the impacts outside the union as well as inside. Finally, it should accommodate the
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1 Mongelli (2002) provides a detailed review of OCA theory and evidence, including its recent development.
non-exclusive benefits of a currency union, to support a widely accepted intuition that a
decrease in regional currencies benefits all regions non-exclusively. Bayoumi (1994) has pro-
posed a model with optimizing consumers and n regions. In order to represent the non-exclu-
sive benefits of a currency union, this paper has modified his model in two ways. First, we
introduce fixed costs of cross-currency transactions, in addition to variable costs, the source of
exclusive benefits in the original model.2 Second, the CES technology with elasticities higher
than one replaces the Cobb-Douglas technology.
The analysis shows that 1) the non-exclusive benefits increase with fixed costs but
decrease with the elasticity of input substitution, and that 2) especially when the elasticity is
close enough to unity, the non-exclusive benefits exceed non-exclusive costs of a union, even
if a fixed cost is small. It also examines how traditional OCA criteria work. Finally, the paper
concludes that it is likely that a currency union has a net positive external effect that causes a
currency union to be too small, and it also emphasizes that the elasticity of input substitution
is crucial to welfare impacts of a currency union.
2  The model
2.1  Utility and consumption
Cobb-Douglas utility function
We have three regions in the world: region 1, region 2, and region 3. Each region special-
izes in producing one good and each good is consumed. A consumer in region i has a Cobb-
Douglas utility function.
where people in region i consume a Cij amount of good j . We let pi be the relative price of
good i to good 1. ?i is a constant, which is equal to 
where
Therefore, region i 's demand for good j is
where Xi is the amount of good i produced.
Variable costs of cross-currency transactions
Because we assume that variable costs of cross-currency transactions take the iceberg
form, people can consume only a T (≤1) portion of one unit of import. We assume that the
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2 Baldwin (2006) focuses on the fixed costs, and assuming that it falls for all exporters to the Eurozone, not just for
firms located inside the Eurozone, suggests that it gives rise to the non-exclusive benefits. 
variable costs are the same across regions. Combining the variable costs with (2) yields the
actual consumption Cij : 
Taking the logarithm, we have 
where ???log(T).
Substituting the actual consumption (3) into the utility function (1), we obtain an indirect
utility function: 
The use of the market equilibrium relative prices eliminates p2 and p3 : 
It shows that the utility at the equilibrium depends on the total output of all goods, the size of
a variable transaction cost, and the share of each good in the total expenditure.
2.2  Production and labor
Labor supply and variety of labor services
Technology is the CES, and the only input is labor. Labor is continuously differentiated in
the range of [0, n].
where ?i is a stochastic disturbance term specific to region i and is normally distributed with
a mean of zero and a variance of ?2i . We assume that ?1=0. As in Matsuyama (1994), ?>1,
which implies that the range of labor services varies.
Firms want to employ a wider range of labor services because it improves the average
productivity of an unit labor. Workers also want to differentiate their labor further. We assume
that the marginal cost of differentiation is zero. The assumption, however, results in an incen-
tive for a worker to divide his labor into many kinds of small parts and as a result, raise the
average product of an unit labor infinitely.
In order to avoid the indeterminancy of the range, we assume that each differentiated labor
must supply at least one unit of service. We assume, in addition, that each specialized labor ser-
vice is inelastically supplied. Therefore, the resource constraint,
Fixed costs of cross-currency transactions
We introduce fixed costs of cross-currency transactions in order to represent the non-
exclusive benefits of a currency union. Cross-currency transactions cost consists of two parts:
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a variable part, which depends on the volume of cross-currency trade, and a fixed part, which
depends on the number of regional currencies required in trade.3 Take the currency union
between region 2 and 3 for example. For region 1, since the volume of cross-currency trade
remains the same before and after the currency union, the total variable cost remains the same.
On the other hand, the number of currencies which region 1 needs for trade does decrease. As
a result, its total fixed cost decreases. A currency union, hence, cuts down part of the fixed
costs, giving benefits to the region outside the union as well.4
In detail, a region is required to spend a certain fixed amount of labor on each cross-cur-
rency trade, regardless of the volume of each trade. The size of the fixed cost depends on the
trading partner. Any region trading with region i spends an Fi amount of labor. We, however,
assume that fixed costs are the same across regions, which means that Fi=F. Then, the curren-
cy union between region 2 and 3 decreases the regional currencies by one, saving every
region, both inside and outside, its total fixed cost by an amount of F.
If we normalize labor endowment in each region to 1, then each region has a (1–2F )
amount of labor available for production. With the currency union between region 2 and 3, the
amount of labor available in each region increases to (1–F) , whether the region is inside or
outside the union. As a result, outputs increase as resources available for production increase.
At the same time, the increases in endowments also expand the potential ranges of differenti-
ated labor inputs, from [0, 1–2F] to [0, 1–F], raising the average product of each unit input.
Nominal wage rigidity and exchange rate
Firms are price-takers in both goods and labor markets. The demand for labor z , Ldi (z) , is
where Pi and Wi (z) represent the price of good i and the wage of labor z in region i. Both are
measured in the same local currency.
Nominal wages in a local currency are fixed at the normal level?i (z), 
where Ei is the price of region i 's currency denominated by region 1's currency. At the wage
rate, when ?i=0 and Ei =1, labor demand is equal to supply. Substituting this wage rate into
the labor demand (8) gives 
where ei =log(Ei). The relative size of ?i and ei determines the labor demand.
As in Bayoumi (1994), the exchange rate is a shock absorber in labor markets. When
region i lets its currency float, the exchange rate nullifies any region-specific shock and
ensures its full employment. Hence, the full employment condition Ldi (z) =1 determines the
exchange rate at 
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3 A couple of examples of fixed costs of cross-currency transactions are provided. If two firms, each located in areas
with different currencies, trade their goods, both firms usually have to have a certain amount of checking accounts, which
usually yield almost no interests, in the partner's local currency. Another example is the reserve assets held in another cur-
rencies by the government or the central bank. The amount of assets held as reserves contains a fixed part which usually
bear relatively lower interests than other available assets would.
4 Micco, Stein, and Ordonez (2003) provides a suggestive result that the Europan Monetary Union has reduced trade
costs between the Eurozone and the rest of the world.
3  Equilibrium
3.1  Equilibrium with no currency union
As mentioned in the last section, if a region lets its currency float, full employment is
ensured. Hence, Li (z)=1 for all i and z . The output is
Taking the logarithm of X i and approximating it linearly, we obtain
Substituting it into the utility function (6) gives 
3.2  Equilibrium with a currency union
We consider the currency union between region 2 and 3, and let E23 (or e23 in the loga-
rithm) be the common exchange rate.
Exchange rate of the common currency and employment in a currency union
We assume that workers cannot move between region 2 and 3 even when the regions form
a currency union. Therefore, for full employment in both regions, the common exchange rate
must satisfy these conditions simultaneously: e23 =?2 and e23 =?3. Evidently, e23 cannot ensure
full employment inside a union, which burdens them with costs, except when ?2=?3.
Unlike the no-union equilibrium, where the full employment conditions determine the
exchange rates, we need another assumption about determination of the common exchange
rate e23 . The common exchange rate is determined by a geometric average of shadow
exchange rates. A shadow exchange rate, Êi or êi , is the exchange rate that results if a region
does not join a union. Therefore, êi =?i. Thus, e23=??2+(1–?)?3, where 0<?<1.
The common exchange rate absorbs any productivity shock, but only partially, inside the
union. The demands for region 2's and region 3's labor are 
Other than when ?2=?3 , one region would have excess demand, while the other would have
excess supply and unemployment. This causes losses in output and costs to the union.
The parameter ? determines more of which disturbance in region 2 and 3 the common
exchange rate will mitigate. The equations (15) and (16) clearly shows that, as ? gets larger,
the exchange rate absorbs more of ?2 and less of ?3 . Therefore, we can interpret the parame-
ter ? as the relative size of economy 2 to 3; the price of a common currency reflects the dis-
turbances in the dominant region more than those in the dominated one.
Welfare impacts of a currency union
Inspecting equation (6) yields 
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where ?Ui and ?xi represent the changes by the formation of a currency union. The equa-
tions allow us to concentrate only on the changes in outputs.
By combining both the negative effects of possible unemployment and the positive effects
of expansion of labor endowment, we obtain the outputs within a union. 
Taking the differences between the equilibrium outputs with and without a currency union
gives 
Because region 1 stays outside and labor is always fully employed, only a decrease in the
total fixed transaction cost can affect x1 . 
Taking the expected values yields 
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where ?23 represents the covariance between ?2 and ?3 , while (·) denotes the probability
density function of a standard normal variate.5
Then, we calculate the impacts of the output changes on welfare. We take the expected
output changes, (25), (26), and (27), and substitute them into the expected values of the utility
changes, (17), (18), and (19), to arrive at the following equations. 
These equations show the parameters that affect the welfare impacts of a currency union and
how they do it. It is also important to note that, as is implied by (28), even the region outside
is affected.
4  Criteria for optimum currency areas
4.1  Variable transaction costs, opneness of an economy, and asymmetry of disturbances
Variable transaction costs
As shown by the second terms in (29) and (30), the larger the variable transaction cost,
the larger the welfare improvement by a currency union. 
Since region 2 does not need to convert currencies in a trade with region 3, it can consume a
larger portion of unit import from 3 than before. Otherwise, the increase in consumption is
larger as the cost of a cross-currency trade takes away a larger part of unit import, that is, T is
smaller or ? is larger.
Furthermore, the effect increases with ?23 and ?32 . A large value of ?23 means a large
amount of import from region 3, which in turn means that the people in region 2 give up a
large portion of the total import for variable transaction costs. The monetary unification with
region 3 saves the costs, increasing the actual consumption of good 3 by the same amount.
The increase is larger as the total import is larger, i.e., ?23 is larger.
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5 These calculations are explained in detail in the appendix.
Openness of an economy
The openness of a region is defined as the share of imported goods in its total expenditure.6
A relatively open region, i.e., a region with smaller ?ii , prefers the other goods to its own
good. The impact of openness, however, is ambiguous with the definition. For example, a
large value of ?23 (region 2 's further openness to region 3) has both positive and negative
impacts on region 2. On the one hand, large ?23 strengthens the effect of a decrease in the
total variable transactions cost. On the other hand, it also strengthens a negative effect because
unemployment in region 3 forces region 2 to consume less of good 3, which region 2 prefers.
Nevertheless, we have one particular case of interest where openness can be an unam-
biguous criterion. That is where an economy is more open to the other member economy and
is relatively small at the same time. Then, an increase in openness reinforces the benefits of a
currency union, and besides, decreases the costs. Since a common exchange rate stabilizes the
output of a larger economy (region 3) better, region 2 often experiences unemployment, while
region 3 rarely does. But if region 2 prefers good 3 to its own, i.e., more open to region 3, it
suffers less from its own unemployment, while benefitting more from the savings in variable
transaction costs.
We can check the result by inspecting (29). 
Suppose that we increase ?23 , with ?21 fixed and ?≤1/2, then the second term increases and
the absolute value of the third term either decreases or stays unchanged. The analysis implies
that a relatively small and open economy can enjoy larger benefit and pay smaller cost when
forming a currency union with a large economy.7
Asymmetry of disturbances
As explained in Section 3, with no currency union, each exchange rate completely
absorbs each region-specific shock. Once two currencies are united into one, however, the
common exchange rate absorbs the shocks inside the union only partially. Therefore, one
region has unemployment, reducing its output and consumption of the good. As the shocks are
more asymmetric, or negatively correlated, the two regions suffer larger costs. Even with the
negative correlation, however, if both of the variances were small, the shocks would be often
similar in size and the common exchange rate would work better. The third terms in the
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6 McKinnon (1963) defines openness as the share of tradable goods to income. In our model, since every good is
tradable, his definition cannot be applied.
7 This statement is similar to McKinnon (1963). A small open economy should abandon its own currency and adopt
the currency of a large partner. Though his suggestion and ours are alike, the rationales behind them are somewhat differ-
ent. His discussion is as follows. Openness of an economy limits the effect of the exchange rate variability on adjustment of
trade balances, because if imported goods from a certain region have a large share in consumption, a change in the
exchange rate with the region will immediately transform into a change in the general price level and can not affect the
terms of trade between the two regions. For such an economy, variability in nominal exchange rate is not effective as an
adjustment tool, and the loss of variability is not costly. Rather, exchange rate variability is even harmful, destabilizing
internal prices.
expected utility changes, (29) and (30), shows that the costs are increasing in ?22 and ?
2
3 and
decreasing in ?23.
Furthermore, we should note that a monetary union has negative external effects. As is
shown in the second term in (28), the region outside suffers as well. This is because when the
asymmetric disturbances decrease the outputs inside the union, region 1 is also forced to con-
sume less of the goods.
4.2  Fixed transaction costs and elasticity of substitution
Fixed transaction costs
If the fixed transactions cost is larger, the welfare improvement of the regions inside is
larger. Differentiating (29) and (30) with respect to F gives the result: 
The inequality is ensured by the assumption of ?>1.
As previously explained, fixed costs affect welfare impacts of a currency union in two
ways. Decreases in the total fixed transaction cost expand the amount of labor available for
production and directly increase the potential outputs. At the same time, the increases in the
availability of labor also expand the potential range of differentiated inputs, raising the aver-
age productivity of each unit labor.
We can show the effect of variety expansion in the same way as Romer (1987) shows. We
let L
–
denote the total amount of labor input, which is fixed, and suppose the labor input is con-
tinuously differentiated in the range of [0, M]. If we let the input of labor z be , the 
resource constraint, , determines as the function of . 
Substituting it into the production function, , we obtain 
Dividing it by the total input L
–
gives the average productivity of unit input, M1/(?–1). This is an
increasing function of M , which is the variety of labor.
More importantly, as shown in the first term in (28), the two effects are not exclusive to
the union members. The benefits spill over to the region that does not participate. The positive
external effect offsets, or in some cases, exceeds the negative external effect of asymmetric
shocks within a union. The result has two implications. First, the region outside the union,
depending on the parameters, enjoys net benefit. Second, closely related to the first implica-
tion, because of its positive externalities, the actual size of a currency union can be smaller
than the socially optimal one. This is in contrast with Bayoumi (1994), where a currency
union has only negative external effects and tends to be too large.
There, however, can naturally arise a question about the size of a fixed cost. The concern
is that it is so small that the welfare impact can be neglected. One possible answer is given in
the following discussion.
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Elasticity of substitution
The last parameter to be examined is elasticity of substitution between specialized labor
inputs. Differentiating (29) with respect to ? shows straightforwardly its impact. 
As ? decreases and approaches to one, a currency union gains a greater positive impact on
welfare.
The elasticity affects welfare by controlling the impact of fixed costs. Differentiating (34)
with respect to ? shows that low elasticities reinforce the marginal impact of fixed costs. 
Especially, when an elasticity is close enough to one, the benefits exceed the costs, pro-
vided that all variances of the shocks are finite. Taking the limit of the first term of (29) shows 
The first term goes to infinity as ? approaches to unity, and the absolute value of the second
term is increasing in ?. So the net benefit (29) is decreasing in ?, unless the square root in
the second term is infinite. Then, for any level of F , there always exists??2 (F)>1, at which the
net benefit is exactly equal to zero. When ?<??2 (F) , the benefits exceed the costs for region
2. Similarly, we can also find ??3 (F) and ??1 (F) . The smallest of them, ??(F) , is the critical
value of elasticity, at which the net benefit of a currency union is at least zero for every region
inside or outside. Because we can find ??(F) for any small F , when an elasticity is suffi-
ciently close to one, the size of a fixed cost is almost irrelevant.
On the other hand, when ? is far larger than one, the effect is no greater than that of a
mere increase in labor.8
With high elasticity, the size of a fixed cost is crucial to welfare impacts of a currency union.
These results imply that, depending on elasticity, a currency union is a public good and
its size tends to be too small, though the previous study often suggests that the EMU should
be smaller. The results also assert that the elasticity of substitution is an crucial criterion for
OCA.
5  Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on the non-exclusive benefits of a currency union with the intention to
balance the views on the cost and benefit aspects, and to evaluate a monetary union favorably,
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8 When an elasticity of substitution is infinite, the CES production function degenerates to a linear production func-
tion, giving no incentive for further specialization. Then, the effect of expansion in endowment is only to increase the
potential output by exactly the same proportion.  On the other hand, when the elasticity equals unity, we have the Cobb-
Douglas production technology, with no possibility of change in varieties of inputs, and the effects of currency union cru-
cially depend upon the size of a fixed cost.
assuming that the non-exclusive benefits arise due to the nature of the fixed costs in cross-cur-
rency transactions and input variety in production. In addition, it is assumed that a currency
union improves the welfares of the regions inside and outside. An implication of the model is
that because of its external effect, the actual size of a currency union can be smaller than the
socially optimal one, despite the many discussions on Europe that focus mainly on the cost
aspects and suggest that the EMU should be smaller. Elasticities close to one ensure that the
effect depends little on the size of a fixed cost. On the other hand, higher elasticities diminish
the non-exclusive benefit and make a currency union more likely to lower the welfare of the
region outside, and in some cases, even the welfares of the union members. Therefore, the
model claims the elasticity to be a crucial criterion for OCA.
Finally, further research should focus on other benefits that this paper does not address.
They include benefits from high degree of capital mobility and from stable relative price
between tradables and non-tradables. Capital is usually allowed to move freely inside a curren-
cy union to enhance the chance for the member regions to smooth out their consumptions
overtime. On the other hand, when nominal prices are not completely flexible, nominal
exchange rate fluctuations caused by nominal shocks disturb the relative price, causing reallo-
cation of resources. Therefore, a currency union eliminates any nominal exchange rate fluctu-
ation inside, and thus prevents nominal shocks from affecting the real side of the economy
through the nominal exchange rates channel.
The underlying shocks, other than productivity shocks, could be taken into account.  The
welfare impacts of a common currency depend on the nature of underlying disturbances, and
many empirical researches have attempted to indentify separate shocks; Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) identifies supply and demand shocks, while Chamie, DeSerres and
Lalonde (1994) further decomposes demand shocks into real and nominal shocks.  
The welfare impact of a currency union among developed and underdeveloped regions
should also be investigated. By allowing fixed costs to be different across regions, our model
will also give insights on why the eastern European countries are eager to join the EMU, not
from a political perspective, but from an economic one.  
Appendix
This appendix demonstrates how to take the expected value of ?x2 in Section 3.2.
First, we derive a formula for calculating expected values. Suppose that y is a stochastic
variable and takes any value in . If S is divided into the two subsets S1 and S2 so that
, the expected value of y can be computed in the following way. 
Next, we calculate the expected value of ?x
2
. Defining y =?2 –?3 , we have, 
With the earlier described assumption on ?2 and ?3 , y is also a normal variate with a mean
zero and a variance of ?22 + ?
2
3 – 2?23. If we represent ?x2 in terms of y , 
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Here, setting S1 = [0,∞) and S2 = (–∞,0) and applying (39) to ?x2 , we obtain 
We apply the following formula from Bayoumi (1994) on the expected value of a normal
variate with a mean of zero to the second term on the last line: 
where (·) and ?(·) denote the p.d.f. and the c.d.f. of a standard normal variate.
Finally, substituting it into (40), we obtain 
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